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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j)(West 2009) and 78A-4-
103(2) (a) (West 2009) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission") and 
Summit County (the "County") restate the Cross-Appellant, 
Summit Water Distribution Company's ("Summit Water"), issue 
2 raised on cross-appeal. The double taxation issue 
identified by Summit Water is more aptly a constitutional 
question. As such, Summit Water's issue 2 is restated as 
follows: 
Is the District Court's conclusion correct that the 
assessment of the water distribution facilities of Summit 
Water did not violate the uniform and equal property 
taxation clauses of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b) 
(2010)?1 
Summit Water cites to Utah Const, art. XIII, §§ 2 and 
3, as the determinative law for this issue, but does not 
quote the provisions. These sections are the uniform and 
equal property tax clauses of the Utah Constitution prior to 
the restatement in S.J.R. 10 (2002 Gen. Sess.) adopted at 
election November 5, 2002. Since the stated purposes of the 
restatement was to modernize, reorganize and make technical 
changes, the current language of the Utah Constitution 
containing the uniform and equal property tax clauses is 
cited in this brief. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court's interpretation of a constitutional 
provision is a question of law. The Court "'reviews legal 
conclusions for correction without deference to the lower 
court." Meyers v. State, 2004 UT 31, 1 9, 194 P.JSd 211. 
However, there are predicate findings of fact. Findings of 
fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Moreno 
v. Bd. of Education, 926 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1) (2010) 
So that each person and corporation pays 
a tax in proportion to the fair market 
value of his, her, or its tangible 
property, all tangible property in the 
State that is not exempt under the laws 
of the United States or under this 
Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its fair market 
value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS 
There are two issues in this matter. The direct appeal 
of the Commission and County addresses whether the District 
Court erred in its broad interpretation of the irrigation 
2 
exemption found in Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West 
2009). The Commission and County have set forth their 
Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts in their 
opening brief as Appellants and limit the discussion here 
only to those factual issues related to the cross-appeal 
filed by Summit Water. 
Summit Water argues on cross-appeal that its water 
distribution facilities are taxed twice; once on the 
property itself and second to the shareholders through the 
assessments on their lots. However, the evidence fails to 
support this assertion. The only evidence submitted was the 
general conclusion that the fair market value of real 
property with access to water is fifty percent more than 
real property without access to water. (R. 2147, Tax Comm'n 
Tr. at 144-45.) This is sometimes referred to here as the 
"enhanced value." No record evidence shows that this 
enhanced value represents the fair market value of the water 
distribution facilities. (R. 2117-2119.) Further, no 
record evidence was submitted that the County Assessor added 
the value of the water distribution facilities to the fair 
market values of the lots. (R. 2117-2119.) 
The Commission and County dispute Summit Water's 
Statement of Fact at page 5, 1 15 of its Opening Brief in 
3 
Cross-Appeal. In that paragraph, Summit Water admits that 
the few pieces of real property it does own were taxed at 
fair market value.2 However, Summit Water then concludes 
that "the fair market value of those properties, and the 
properties served by Summit Water and owned by its 
shareholders, includes the value of the water distribution 
facilities appurtenant to those properties.'' rd. The trial 
court made no such finding. (See R. 2078-84.) Summit Water 
failed to submit evidence on the methods used by the county 
assessor to value these parcels. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONSE ON CROSS-APPEAL. 
Summit Water asserts in its cross-appeal that its water 
distribution facilities have been "impermissibly" double 
taxed. Double taxation in the context of property tax is 
not prohibited unless it violates the uniform and equal 
property tax clauses found in Utah Const, art. XIII, § 
2(1)(a) and (b). 
This Court, in McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, 164 P. 852, 
2
 These seven parcels are relatively insignificant in 
value and the crux of Summit Water's argument lies with the 
lots owned by its shareholders, not these few parcels. (R. 
438, Fixed Asset Ledger showing Summit Water's real property 
at less than .05% of the total assets.) Nevertheless, 
factual statement f 15 is unsupported and needs correction. 
4 
854 (Utah 1917), summarized the elements required for 
unconstitutional double taxation: 
(1) the property must be taxed twice; 
(2) the burden of the property tax falls on the same 
person; and 
(3) similar property is only taxed once. 
Summit Water must satisfy all three elements to 
establish a constitutional violation. 
The water distribution facilities are not taxed twice. 
The only evidence submitted by Summit Water in support of 
this assertion is that the fair market values of the lots 
owned by its shareholders are higher because of the 
availability of water. This argument was rejected by this 
Court in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 
1970). Because this argument fails, Summit Water also fails 
to show that the burden of the property tax imposed on the 
water distribution facilities falls on the same person. 
Finally, Summit Water has failed to show that similar 
property is only taxed once. The argument made by Summit 
Water in this regard is that municipality owned water 
distribution facilities are exempt, therefore owners of lots 
who purchase water from such systems are subject to taxation 
only once. Municipal water distribution companies are not 
5 
the same as a cooperative water distribution company. In 
any event, Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1) expressly states 
that exemptions do not establish a violation of the uniform 
and equal property tax clauses. 
II. REPLY ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
The Court in Holliday Water has already held that the 
"irrigation exemption" applies only for property used to 
irrigate land for agriculture. Even if the Court does not 
accept the Holliday Water definition, the term to "irrigate 
land" at the time the constitutional exemption was enacted 
pertained to agriculture. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
ASSESSMENT OF THE WATER DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES OF 
SUMMIT WATER DID NOT VIOLATE THE UNIFORM AND EQUAL 
PROPERTY TAX CLAUSES FOUND IN UTAH CONST. ART. 
XIII, § 2(1) (a) and (b) . 
Summit Water contests on cross-appeal the District 
Court's ultimate conclusion that Summit County's assessment 
of its water distribution facilities was not double taxation 
in violation of the Utah Constitution. The District Court 
made a variety of conclusions and findings in support of its 
ultimate conclusion on this issue, any one of which require 
the ultimate conclusion to be sustained. (See Findings of 
6 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, October 6, 2009, pp. 11-
14. Addendum D, Commission's and County's Opening Brief 
discussed infra.) (R. 2117-2120.) 
The Utah Constitution does not prohibit double taxation 
per se in the property tax context. Double Taxation is only 
prohibited if it violates the uniform and equal property tax 
clauses found in article XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b) of the Utah 
Constitution. See McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, 164 P. 852, 
854 (Utah 1917) (holding that double taxation is only a 
constitutional violation if it violates the uniform and 
equal property tax clauses of the Utah Constitution). 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 provides: 
(1) So that each person and corporation 
pays a tax in proportion to the fair 
market value of his, or its tangible 
property, all tangible property in the 
State that is not exempt under the laws 
of the United States or under this 
Constitution shall be: 
(a) assessed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its fair market 
value, to be ascertained as provided by 
law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate. 
This Court in McCormick identified the elements that 
must be proved for double taxation to violate these clauses. 
164 P. at 854. The Court stated: 
7 
It is not contemplated that, when 
property is once assessed for general 
taxes according to its value and at the 
same rate as other property subject to 
the same tax is assessed, it may again be 
taxed in some other way when the burden 
of both taxes falls on the same person, 
while other property subject to the same 
tax is assessed but once. 
Id. 
Based on McCormick, the required elements for a 
constitutional violation are: 
(1) the property must be taxed twice; 
(2) the burden of the tax must fall on the same person, 
and 
(3) similar properties are taxed only once. 
Summit Water failed to prove any of these elements. 
See also Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371, 372 
(Utah 1970) (holding that the McCormick elements were not 
met in the case of a culinary water company like Summit 
Water). 
Summit Water's double taxation argument hinges on the 
assumption that its water distribution facilities have been 
assessed to the real property "lots"' owned by its 
shareholders. Summit Water offers no evidence showing that 
the assessor made a specific addition to the fair market 
value of the lots for the water distribution facilities. 
8 
Rather, Summit Water offers appraiser testimony that the 
fair market value of a lot with water available is worth 50% 
more than a lot without water available. (See Summit 
Water's Opening Brief in Cross-Appeal, at 4, f 9.) This 
argument fails to satisfy the McCormick elements^ 
A. The same property is not taxed twice. 
The assessment at issue here is on the water 
distribution facilities owned by Summit Water. Summit Water 
asserts that its property is taxed twice: once in 
assessments on lots owned by its shareholders and second, by 
an assessment of its water distribution facilities as 
separate property. Summit Water argues that the fair market 
values of the lots are 50% higher than lots without access 
to water and this 50% increase represents the value of the 
water distribution facilities. 
The District Court rejected this argument by making the 
following conclusions and findings: (1) concluding that 
water distribution facilities and the lots of the 
shareholders are not the same property;3 (2) holding that 
3
 The District Court held: "15. Summit Water is a legal 
entity having a separate and independent existence from its 
shareholders. The taxation of one is not necessarily the 
taxation of the other." (R. 2118; Commission's and County's 
Opening Brief, Addendum D, at 12.) 
9 
the lot's enhanced value due to water access does not mean 
that the value of the water distribution facilities have 
been assessed twice;4 and (3) finding that no evidence 
showed that the assessments on lots separately added the 
fair market value of the water distribution facilities.5 
1. Shareholder Lots Are Not the Same 
Property as Summit Water's Distribution 
Facilities. 
The lots of the shareholders are not the same property 
4
 The District Court concluded as follows: "22. Although 
nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a 
property's fair market value, it cannot be concluded that 
the value of those facilities or buildings necessarily 
corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that facilities 
and buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be 
taxed differently." (R. 2120; Commission's and County's 
Opening Brief, Addendum D at 14.) 
5
 The District Court found in its decision the 
following: "17. Summit Water has failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence the amount, if any, the value 
of the Water Distribution Facilities that was, is, or would 
be included in the valuation of the real property owned by 
its shareholders and serviced by the facilities. 18. Summit 
Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that any increase in the assessed valuation of real property 
serviced by the Water Distribution Facilities is solely 
attributable to the value of the facilities. 19. Even 
assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to 
the value of the facilities, Summit Water has failed to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 50% increase in 
the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the 
water made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is 
a proper measure of the facilities." These are all findings 
of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. (R. 
2118-2119; Commission's and County's Opening Brief, Addendum 
D at 12 and 13.) 
10 
as the water distribution facilities. As a result, the 
water distribution facilities can be separately assessed at 
their fair market value. See Holliday Water, 466 P.2d at 
374 (holding that "the Constitution did not provide that 
culinary water rights and the facilities used to^distribute 
them were not to be separately taxed . . . . " ) . The concept 
that Utah law requires the separate assessment of the water 
distribution facilities is self evident: a constitutional 
exemption exists to exempt property used to "irrigate 
lands." Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West 2009). Such 
exemption would not be necessary if Utah law did not require 
separate taxation of irrigation property. 
Summit Water cites only one case to suggest that its 
water distribution facilities cannot be separately assessed. 
See Brady Irr. Co. v. Teton County, 85 P.2d 350 (Mont. 1938) 
(holding that dams, ditches and canals that are appurtenant 
to real property have no separate use under Montana law). 
Summit Water does not explain how Brady applies to its 
situation that consists of culinary water distribution 
facilities not on the lots. In any event, the reasoning in 
Brady has long been rejected by most, if not all, 
jurisdictions. Storrie Project Water Users Ass'n v. 
Gonzales, 209 P.2d 530, 535 (N.M. 1949). In Storrie, the 
11 
court declared: 
Not a single state, except Montana 
[referring to Brady1/ so far as our 
research discloses, has adopted the 
practice of assessing the physical works 
of mutual benefit irrigation districts, 
such as the one here involved, in the 
enhanced value of the lands irrigated 
without the help of a statute or a 
Constitutional provision. 
Id. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court based its rejection of the 
Brady analysis on the premise, similar to Utah law, that 
"all tangible property is subject to taxation" and "any such 
property is presumed to have some value, even though it be 
only a nominal one." 85 P.2d at 534; accord Utah Const. 
art. XIII, § 2(1). 
2. The Alleged Enhancement of Lots Does Not 
Result in Double Taxation. 
The District Court correctly held that the 
"enhancement" theory does not constitute double taxation. 
This Court in Holliday Water held that the enhancement of 
residential property from access to water does not mean that 
water facilities owned by a water company were double taxed. 
466 P.2d at 374. 
The holding in Holliday Water, 466 P.2d 371, is 
supported by Storrie, 209 P.2d at 535. The Storrie court 
12 
reasoned that the value of any property is affected by its 
location and surrounding properties. Such fact does not 
prevent such property from being separately assessed. Id. 
The District Court, in this matter, also identified this 
problem with Summit Water's theory. The District Court 
noted: 
The logic underlying the double taxation 
argument [of Summit Water] is specious. 
Property values are impacted by many 
factors, including whether one's 
neighbors maintain or fail to maintain 
their properties, or a big box store is 
built next door, or the property is 
surrounded by parks, schools, green space 
or other public amenities. Just because 
nearby facilities and buildings may 
increase or decrease a property's fair 
market value, we may not conclude that 
the value of those facilities or building 
. . . should not be taxed. 
(R. 2099; District Court Ruling, Commission's and County's 
Opening Brief, Addendum C, at 25.) 
Indeed, if Summit Water's theory were accepted, then 
well cared for homes that cause an increase in the value of 
neighboring homes would be subject to impermissible double 
taxation. Or, alternatively, if Summit Water's arguments 
are taken to the extreme, the increased value in the 
neighboring homes should be deducted from such homes and 
added to the value of the well cared for homes. Such a 
13 
result is unworkable. See Storrie 209 P.2d at 535 
(discussing the inconsistency of the enhancement theory and 
its impractical application in property tax administration). 
3. The Assessor Did Not Add a Separate Value 
on the Lots for Summit Water's 
Distribution Facilities. 
The District Court, by rejecting the enhancement 
theory, correctly found that Summit Water had not shown the 
Assessor had added to the fair market value of the lots a 
value for the water distribution facilities of Summit Water. 
Summit Water does not challenge that finding here. Holliday 
Water reached the same determinative finding. 4 66 P.2d at 
535 (finding that "no evidence that the assessor, in 
appraising the residences of the shareholders, added to the 
valuation of the property the shareholders' pro rata share 
of the assessed valuation of the water system."). 
For these reasons, Summit Water's distribution 
facilities have not been taxed twice. 
B. The Tax Burden Does Not Fall on the Same 
Person. 
For reasons similar to those stated in Section I.A, the 
tax burden also does not fall on the same person.6 The 
6
 The District Court stated in its decision: "20. 
Summit Water has not shown by a preponderance of the 
14 
property tax here falls upon property owned by Summit Water 
and Summit Water bears the burden to pay the property tax. 
In contrast, the property tax assessed on the lots of Summit 
Water's shareholders falls upon the respective owners, not 
Summit Water.7 
evidence that the increase in the assessed valuation of real 
property attributable to the water made available by the 
Water Distribution Facilities corresponds to the 
proportional value of the facilities imputable to the 
shareholder. In other words, there is insufficient evidence 
correlating the use of the Water Distribution Facilities by 
a given parcel, the parcel's proportional share of the value 
of the Water Distribution Facilities based on such use, any 
increase in the value of the parcel attributable to the 
water supplied. 21. Summit Water has failed to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, if the Water 
Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount that should 
be passed on to its shareholders in proportion to the 
increase in value to the shareholders' property that is 
attributable to the water supplied by the facilities by the 
property. In fact, the classes of shareholders would appear 
to bear apportionment and assessment of operating expenses 
differently, based on class and number of shares held, 
without taking into account the nature and extent of water 
usage or the distance between the source and terminus." (R. 
2119; Commission's and County's Opening Brief, Addendum D at 
13. ) 
7
 Summit Water also owns seven parcels of real property 
and alleges that the value of the water distribution 
facilities were partially included in the assessments for 
these parcels similar to the lots of its shareholders. Such 
parcels contain only a small portion of the water 
distribution facilities. (R. 438, fixed asset ledger showing 
Summit Water's real property at less than .05% of the total 
assets). More importantly, the issue of double taxation is 
a valuation issue and Summit Water did not contest the 
valuation of the lots below and should not be permitted to 
raise it here under the guise of a double taxation argument. 
15 
In McCormick, the Court found that a property tax upon 
the capital stock of a bank violated the constitutional 
provisions of uniformity when, at the same time, a property 
tax was imposed upon real property effectively owned by the 
bank. 164 P. at 855. McCormick essentially concluded that 
the manner of valuing the capital stock, by using the 
capital account, represented the real estate which was also 
subject to tax. Icl. Lots owned directly by shareholders of 
a water distribution company are not representative property 
of the water company's distribution facilities, which are 
separate tangible property. 
It is important to note that the conclusions made in 
McCormick were aided by a specific statutory scheme not 
present here. The statutes authorizing the imposition of 
the property tax upon capital stock expressly required the 
value of the real estate of the bank subject to tax to be 
deducted from the value of the capital stock, presumably to 
make the statutes compliant with the Constitution. Icl. at 
854 (stating that "[t]o meet the requirements of the 
Constitution [the uniform and equal clauses] in that regard, 
See Woodbury AmSource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, 
f 190, 73 P.3d 362 (concluding that a double taxation 
argument must be contested as a valuation case). 
16 
in so far as they relate to the taxation of the capital 
stock and assets-property-of banking corporations, the 
Legislature presumably enacted sections [1907 Utah Laws §§ 
2505, 2507, 2508 and 2509 specifying the method of valuation 
and deductions from value for capital stock]"). 
Here, the double tax argument lies with two separate 
tangible properties, both of which have their own fair 
market value. In contrast, the statutory method used in 
McCormick to calculate the value of the capital stock 
expressly included the value invested in the real estate and 
required a deduction for real estate in proportion to the 
"value of the capital stock surplus, reserve and undivided 
profits of such bank . . . ." 1907 Utah Laws § 2509. 
Finally, if double taxation has occurred as alleged, it 
is not Summit Water who bears the burden of both taxes. At 
best, it would be the owners of the lots, the shareholders. 
The shareholders should be the party making the claim. See 
McCormick, 164 P. at 852 (the shareholder, the bank, brought 
the action). Sound policy justifies this result so that the 
actual assessments of the lots are presented before the 
trial court or administrative body to consider the methods 
and valuation techniques used by the assessor. See Woodbury 
Amsource, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 28, 1 190, 73 
17 
P.3d 362 (emphasizing that double taxation arguments require 
an analysis of the "appraisal methodology that the county 
assessors may, or may not, have used when assessing their 
property"). Further, Woodbury made it very clear that the 
procedures to claim a refund are limited and must be 
precisely followed. Ld. at 1 15. Shareholders should not 
be permitted to circumvent these procedures through Summit 
Water's claim here. 
C. Summit Water Has Failed to Show That Similar 
Property Is Only Assessed Once. 
Even if Summit Water can show that its water 
distribution facilities are taxed twice, and the burden of 
such tax falls on the same person, it cannot show that other 
similar property is taxed only once. Summit Water asserts 
that its shareholders are taxed twice while residential 
owners who are serviced by exempt municipal corporations or 
individual facilities are only taxed once. There is no 
evidence to support this allegation. The District Court 
correctly found "Summit Water has not carried its burden of 
proof in establishing that, if the Water Distribution 
Facilities were separately taxed as personal property, there 
would be an impermissible variation in the manner in which 
the facilities are taxed compared to other personal 
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property. . . ." (R. 2120; Commission and County's Opening 
Brief, Addendum D; 1 23 at 14.) 
Summit Water's premise is that because municipal water 
distribution facilities are exempt, its shareholders are 
taxed twice, while municipally serviced property owners are 
taxed only once. This argument fails as a matter of law. 
The uniform and equal property tax clauses of the Utah 
Constitution expressly do not apply in the case of an 
exemption. The Utah Constitution states: "all tangible 
property that is not exempt under the laws of the United 
States or under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at 
a uniform and equal rate . . . ." Utah Const, art. XIII, § 
2(1)(emphasis added). If exemptions were a basis to 
establish a violation of the uniform and equal property tax 
clauses, then the existence of any exemption would cause the 
taxation of non-exempt property to violate the uniform and 
equal property tax clauses. 
Summit Water's unsubstantiated assertion that 
"individual facilities" are also not subject to separate 
taxation must also fail. There is no evidence as to what 
these individuals facilities are, whether they are exempt 
under the irrigation exemption, or whether they were added 
to the valuation of the real property upon which they may be 
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located. 
For these reasons, Summit Water has failed to establish 
a violation of Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2(1)(a) and (b). 
II. COMMISSION'S AND COUNTY'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 
THEIR BRIEF ON THE IRRIGATION EXEMPTION. 
A. Summit Water Fails to Distinguish Holliday 
Water, the Only Case Addressing the Term 
"Irrigating Land" in the Context of the Utah 
Constitution's Irrigation Exemption. 
The only case addressing the terms "irrigating land" or 
"to irrigate land" as presently found in the irrigation 
exemption contained in Utah Const, art. XIII § 3(1)(i) (West 
2009) is Hollidav Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 
1970). There, the Court held that the term "irrigating 
land" should be "strictly limited" to the "agricultural 
sense." Id. at 372. Holliday Water expressly sustained the 
same conclusion by the trial court. The trial court relied 
in part, upon 30 Am. Jur. Irrigation § 2 (1958) to define 
the term "irrigation"). .Id. 372. This definition in its 
entirety reads: 
[i]rrigation is defined as the artificial 
watering of agricultural land in regions 
where the rainfall is insufficient for 
crops. The ordinary and popular 
conception denotes the application of 
water to land for the production of 
crops, the term embraces all artificial 
watering of lands, whether by channels, 
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by flooding, or merely by sprinkling. 
30 Am. Jur. Irrigation § 2 (1958)(emphasis added). 
Summit Water does not directly contest the Commission's 
argument that the phrase in the Court's definition, 
"embraces all artificial watering of land" refers, to the 
mode or manner in which irrigation can be performed, rather 
than the meaning of the term. Instead, Summit Water 
attempts to dismiss the cited definition as ambiguous. The 
cited definition is not ambiguous and the Commission's 
interpretation is supported by the full language of the 
cited definition. 
Summit Water's argument that the Court in Holliday 
Water did not need to limit the term "irrigating land" to 
the "agricultural sense" to sustain the trial court misses 
the point. The Court in Holliday Water defined the term 
and, in so doing, limited it to agriculture. As a result, 
for the past forty years, at a minimum, this has been the 
law in Utah. 
Contrary to Summit Water's assertion, the Holliday 
Water Court did need to define "irrigating land." To 
determine whether the property qualified for the irrigation 
exemption, the Court had to determine whether the use fell 
within the exemption or outside of it. The Holliday Water 
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Court drew the line by defining the term "irrigating land." 
This definition, coupled with the strict construction 
requirement for tax exemptions, requires that the irrigation 
exemption be limited to agriculture. See Corporation of the 
Episcopal Church v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 919 P^d 556, 558 
(Utah 1996)(holding that tax exemptions must be "strictly 
construed."). Moreover, "[t]he burden of establishing the 
exemption lies with the entity claiming it . . . ." Id. 
(citations omitted). Summit Water has provided no other 
case law addressing the terms "irrigate" or "irrigating 
lands" in the context of the irrigation exemption. Indeed, 
none of the cases cited by Summit Water define the terms.8 
These cases simply use the terms in passing for descriptive 
purposes; a variety of words could have been used in their 
place. The use of these terms for descriptive purposes 
fails to aid Summit Water in overcoming its burden to show 
it is entitled to an exemption. 
B. Summit Water Incorrectly Dismisses the 
Relevance of the Common Understanding of the 
Term "Irrigating Land" at the Time the 
Constitution Was Enacted. 
In the event the Court does not find the definition in 
Summit Water cites to Mt. Olivet Ass'n v. Salt Lake 
City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925), and In re Gen. Determination 
of Water Rights, 2004 UT 67, 98 P.3d 1. 
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Holliday Water controlling, then it must render its own 
definition. The Commission and County provide support in 
their opening brief that the term "irrigating land" used 
when the exemption was adopted is commonly associated with 
agriculture. Summit Water suggests a broader meaning. 
Even if Summit Water's proposed definition is 
plausible, where two plausible definitions exist, the Court 
can consider the common and ordinary meaning at the time of 
the enactment of the Utah Constitution. American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 1 12, 140 P.3d 123 
(stating that the "goal of this analysis is to discern the 
intent and purpose of both the drafters of our constitution 
and, more importantly, the citizens who voted it into 
effect."). 
The Commission has provided two definitions from 
dictionaries in the 1890s. (See Appellants' Opening Brief 
at 16.) These excerpts show that the ordinary use of the 
term "irrigation" pertained to agriculture. Given that tax 
exemptions are strictly construed, these definitions require 
that the Court limit the irrigation exemption to 
agricultural purposes. 
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C. Strict Construction of the Term "Irrigating 
Land" Will Not Lead to Absurd Results. 
Summit Water asserts that the Commission's 
interpretation will lead to absurd results. Certainly, 
difficulties exist in applying any exemption. Presumably, 
that is one reason why exemptions are narrowly construed. 
However, the difficulties in administering the exemption are 
far less under the Commission's interpretation than those 
created by the District Court's expansive exemption. For 
example, Summit Water could only establish the amount of 
water used for "irrigating land" through statistics by 
comparing winter and summer usage of its customers. (R. 
243-250, 875-882.) Certainly, one might surmise that a 
significant portion of the increased usage in summer did not 
at all relate to irrigating land. A portion of the 
increased summer usage could be related to the filling of 
swimming pools, washing cars, or other outside uses not 
related to "irrigating land" under any reasonable 
definition. This imprecise measurement is the direct 
consequence of the District Court's broad interpretation. 
Further, the expansive definition of the District Court 
potentially expands the definition to include sprinkler 
systems of homeowners and golf courses. This raises 
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significant administrative disruptions that are avoided by a 
narrow interpretation of the term "irrigating land." 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's conclusion of no double taxation 
should be affirmed. The District Court's expansirve 
application of the irrigation exemption should be reversed. 
DATED this Qjl day of September, 2010. 
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